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 This article examines the private law enforcement of English settlement and 
 jurisdiction agreements where pre-emptive parallel proceedings have been 
 commenced in the courts of another EU Member State. It will be argued that in The 
 Alexandros T the UK Supreme Court adopted a narrow and instrumental ‘mirror 
 images’ interpretation of the ‘same cause of action’ issue in Article 27 of the Brussels 
 I Regulation which allowed the English and the Greek proceedings to continue in 
 parallel. In cases where the strict tripartite test of Article 27 is not met, Article 28 
 with its discretionary power to stay in case of related actions is available as a more 
 flexible alternative. It will be argued that the exercise of the discretion to stay 
 proceedings under Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation was legitimately denied 
 effect in order to accord deference to jurisdictional party autonomy. The Court of 
 Appeal’s decision clarifying that the claims for declarations and damages for breach 
 of exclusive jurisdiction agreements are not in breach of EU law will not be the final 
 word on this contentious and as yet unresolved issue. Any argument supporting the 
 enforcement of the private law rights and obligations of the parties to the 
 jurisdiction or settlement agreement may be deemed by the CJEU as necessarily 
 infringing the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) and the principle of 
 mutual trust which animates the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order of the 
 Brussels I Regulation. 
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A. Introduction 
The decisions of the superior courts of England and Wales in The Alexandros T are very significant in 
relation to the enforcement of English settlement and jurisdiction agreements in cases involving 
parallel proceedings in another EU Member State. The terms of a full and final settlement between 
the insurers1F1 and the ship owners2F2 arising out of the loss of the vessel The Alexandros T were in 
danger of being unravelled in the Greek courts three years after the conclusion of the settlement 
agreement. This article endeavours to examine The Alexandros T litigation in the English courts with 
reference to the prevailing legislative, judicial and academic authorities on parallel litigation and the 
enforcement of jurisdictional party autonomy in the EU.      
 The initial proceedings arose from the loss of the vessel The Alexandros T off the coast of 
South Africa. In 2006, Starlight sued the insurers in England. Starlight’s claim was denied by the 
insurers on the basis that the vessel was unseaworthy with the privity of Starlight. In response, 
Starlight made a number of serious allegations against the insurers including allegations of 
misconduct involving tampering with and bribing of witnesses. These proceedings settled pursuant 
to Tomlin orders,3F3 and the settlement agreements contained exclusive English jurisdiction clauses. 
However, in 2009 Starlight launched nine sets of proceedings in Greece against the insurers, 
reiterating the same allegations that had been raised and settled in England, although they were 
expressed as torts actionable in Greece. In 2011, the insurers applied to the English courts to enforce 
the terms of the 2006 settlements, and brought new proceedings in England for damages, an 
indemnity and declarations concerning the breach of that settlement. Starlight applied for a stay of 
these proceedings, first pursuant to Article 284F4 then Article 275F5 of the Brussels I Regulation.6F6 Burton 
1One group of insurers was described as the Company Market Insurers (‘CMI’) and the other group was 
described as the Lloyd’s Market Insurers (‘LMI’). 
2Starlight Shipping Company (‘Starlight’). 
3See infra n 103. 
4Art 28 (Brussels I Regulation). 
  “1. Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the 
court first seised may stay its proceedings. 
  2. Where these actions are pending at first instance, any court other than the court first seised may also, on   
the application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the court first seised has jurisdiction over the 
actions in question and its law permits the consolidation thereof. 
  3. For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely connected that 
it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
from separate proceedings.”  
5Art 27 (Brussels I Regulation). 
  “1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the 
courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its 
proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. 
  2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first seised 
shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.” 
6Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (Brussels I) [2001] OJ L12/1 (‘Brussels I Regulation’). In accordance with Art 81 of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast), the Recast Regulation applies as of 10 January 2015 to legal proceedings 
instituted (and to judgments rendered) on or after that date. As The Alexandros T litigation in the English 
courts was governed by the Brussels I Regulation, reference to its articles is supplemented by the Recast 
Regulation’s closest equivalent provisions in the footnotes where relevant. New provisions and provisions that 
override aspects of the operation of the Brussels I Regulation in relation to parallel proceedings and the 
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J refused to grant a stay under Article 28 and gave summary judgment to the insurers.7F7 The Court of 
Appeal held that it was bound to stay the 2006 proceedings under Article 27, which provides for a 
mandatory stay, and it was not therefore necessary to reach a final determination of the position 
under Article 28.8F8 Before the Supreme Court of the UK, the insurers challenged the correctness of 
the Court of Appeal’s conclusion under Article 27 and submitted that the judge was correct to refuse 
a stay under Article 28. 
 The decision of the Supreme Court of the UK in The Alexandros T examined the provisions on 
lis alibi pendens, related actions and seisin under Articles 27, 28 and 30 respectively of the Brussels I 
Regulation.9F9 Although the UK Supreme Court was unanimous in deciding that Article 27 did not 
apply to the claims relating to an indemnity and exclusive jurisdiction agreement, a majority (Lord 
Mance and Lord Neuberger dissenting) held that Article 27 did not apply to the insurers application 
for declaratory judgments that they were released from all claims in view of the full and final 
settlement of the claims. The UK Supreme Court was unanimous in its judgment that, if Article 28 
applied, as the proceedings were related actions, and if the English court were second seised, they 
would not exercise their discretion to stay the English proceedings in light of the English jurisdiction 
agreements. 
 After the landmark ruling of the UK Supreme Court the case was remitted back to the Court 
of Appeal for consideration of the appeal from the summary judgment of the judge at first 
instance.10F10 The decision of Burton J was upheld, allowing declarations and damages to be claimed 
for breach of English jurisdiction agreements by the institution of proceedings in another Member 
State (Greece). It was decided that neither the damages remedy nor claims for declarations for 
breach of English jurisdiction agreements violated EU law. 
 Flaux J has recently delivered judgment in the latest instalment of The Alexandros T 
litigation.11F11 The decision concerns relief sought by the insurers and servants and agents of the 
insurers, against whom proceedings had been commenced in Greece. The ruling is particularly 
instructive in its approach to granting equitable relief where proceedings are brought before the 
courts of another Member State in breach of the settlement agreement and where the English court 
is unable to grant an anti-suit injunction to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction agreement due to the 
constraints imposed by the European Union law of international civil procedure. 
 This article will commence with a cursory look at the factors giving rise to the phenomena of 
parallel proceedings and the legal techniques used to manage and control the incidence of 
enforcement of jurisdictional party autonomy in the EU are considered in the course of examining the series of 
decisions.      
7 Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others [2011] EWHC 3381 (Comm); [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 162 (Burton 
J). 
8Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others [2012] EWCA Civ 1714; [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 217 (Longmore, 
Toulson and Rimer LJJ). 
9The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70; [2014] 1 All ER 590 (Lords Neuberger, Mance, Clarke, Sumption and 
Hughes); See Y Baatz, “The effectiveness of settlement agreements and English jurisdiction agreements” 
[2014] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 159; J McComish, “Stay of Parallel Proceedings and the 
Brussels I Regulation” (2014) Cambridge Law Journal 270. 
10Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others [2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ, Rimer LJ and Lord 
Toulson). 
11Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others [2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm) (Flaux J). 
3 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
concurrent proceedings in international commercial litigation. The collective impact of the CJEU’s 
landmark decisions curbing jurisdictional party autonomy and its enforcement in the EU along with 
innovative alternative remedies developed by the English courts for the European conflicts of 
jurisdictions are then considered. The concept animating Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I 
Regulation is also explored. The decision of the Supreme Court of the UK in The Alexandros T is then 
examined within the framework of the existing judicial decisions and academic commentary on 
Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation. The ramifications of the decision for the management 
and control of parallel proceedings, the potential risk of irreconcilable or inconsistent judgments, the 
deference accorded to the principle of party autonomy, and the prospects for emerging tactical 
ploys in the European Union law of international civil procedure are analysed. At this juncture, the 
amendments to the lis pendens provisions seeking to augment jurisdictional party autonomy in the 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast) are discussed.12F12 The recent Court of Appeal ruling upholding Burton J’s 
first instance decision awarding declarations and damages for breach of English exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements is then assessed. In particular, the compatibility of these alternative remedies with the 
Brussels I Regulation’s multilateral ‘double convention’13F13 system prioritizing the principles of mutual 
trust and the effectiveness of the Regulation (effet utile) is examined. Flaux J’s recent decision 
concerning the construction of the settlement agreement and the specific performance of the LMI 
settlement agreement is also considered.    
 
B. The phenomena of parallel proceedings in private international law 
The term ‘parallel proceedings’ refers to the concurrence of legal proceedings in the courts of two 
different legal systems over the same or closely related matters.14F14 The rise in the incidence of 
parallel proceedings worldwide is driven by the demands of globalization, technological 
advancements15F15 and the movement of persons, companies and property across borders with little or 
no hindrance.16F16 Delocalised transnational transactions with links to more than one state are 
increasingly frequent in the world today and these transactions have the potential to give rise to 
multistate civil and commercial litigation where multiple national courts exercise ‘horizontally’17F17 
overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction.18F18 With a range of potential fora available to the prospective 
12Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] 
OJ L351/1 (‘Brussels I Regulation Recast’). 
13‘conventions that regulate jurisdiction both at the decision stage and at the recognition stage’: R Michaels, 
‘Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgment Conventions’ in E Gottschalk, R 
Michaels, G Ruhl and J von Hein (eds), Conflict of Laws in a Globalized World (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 29-30. 
14G A Bermann, “Parallel Litigation: Is Convergence Possible?” (2011) Yearbook of Private International Law 21, 
21; G A Bermann, “Parallel Litigation: Is Convergence Possible?” in K Boele-Woelki, T Einhorn, D Girsberger and 
S Symeonides (eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law – Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr 
(Eleven International Publishing, 2010) 579, 579. 
15Technological advancements in transport and telecommunication in particular. 
16See A S Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2003) 1-5; The 
European Union’s internal market seeks to guarantee the free movement of goods, capital, services, and 
people within the EU’s twenty eight Member States: See, generally, M Horspool and M Humphreys, European 
Union Law (7th Edn, Oxford University Press, 2012) Chapters 9-13.  
17C McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 40-44. 
18Bell (supra n 16) 5-14; McLachlan (supra n 17) 44-46 . 
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claimant, the claimant will seek a forum which provides the most advantageous set of procedural, 
substantive and choice of law rules.19F19 This practice of a rational claimant choosing the most 
advantageous forum to litigate in is referred to as ‘forum shopping’.20F20 
 In a globalized world where multiple fora exercise horizontally overlapping jurisdiction and 
forum shopping is a norm, parallel litigation can principally arise in two scenarios.21F21 First, is the case 
of a preliminary tactical skirmish between the claimant and the defendant over the issue of 
jurisdiction, in which each party commences proceedings in their preferred forum. This ‘litigation 
about where to litigate’ determines the jurisdiction where the case will be heard on the merits. 
However, this tactical battle over jurisdiction need not result in a full trial on the merits of the 
dispute as a party may capitulate and compromise as a result of the crystallization of the civil 
procedural and private international law norms on the selection of a forum. Secondly, the 
prospective claimant may have sound reasons to commence and pursue until trial coordinated 
parallel litigation in more than one state. A very common example of this is international fraud 
litigation, where the widespread nature of the fraud and its perpetrators, and the dissipation of its 
monetary proceeds may necessitate a coordinated attempt at multistate litigation.   
 
C. Legal techniques for the control of competing jurisdictions 
The control and management of parallel proceedings with multiple jurisdictions being seised of the 
same or related matter is an issue which needs resolution.22F22 However, there is no one single 
definitive response to lis pendens, but a variety of approaches each rooted in their respective legal 
tradition and culture.23F23 This section will identify these different approaches before moving on to 
examine the CJEU’s very significant rulings limiting the enforcement of jurisdictional party autonomy 
in the European Union Judicial Area. Alternative remedies for the conflicts of jurisdictions developed 
by the English common law of conflict of laws in the form of declarations and damages for breach of 
English exclusive jurisdiction agreements may yet fill the void created by the now defunct anti suit 
injunction.   
 One way of approaching the issue is to tolerate parallel proceedings and leave any questions 
of conflicting judgments to be dealt with at the recognition and enforcement of judgments stage, by 
application of the rules of res judicata.24F24 A second set of techniques is simple rules of priority as 
19Bell (supra n 16) 23-48. 
20The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 436, 471 Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated that: “’Forum shopping’ is a dirty word; 
but it is only a pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdiction, he will naturally 
choose the one in which he thinks his case can most favourably be presented: this should be a matter neither 
for surprise nor for indignation.” 
21McLachlan (supra n 17) 36-40. 
22McLachlan (supra n 17) 21, states the objectives of the rules for the control of international parallel 
proceedings: (a) as a pre-emptive corollary of the res judicata effect of foreign judgments; (b) to promote 
judicial efficiency; (c) as a means of declining or fine-tuning otherwise excessive exercises of original 
jurisdiction; (d) to promote comity between courts and (e) to promote the Rule of Law by providing due 
process for the fair trial of the dispute. 
23A T von Mehren and E Gottschalk, Adjudicatory Authority in Private International Law: A Comparative Study 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 350; Bermann, supra n 14, 21.  
24Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines 731 F. 2d 909 (DC Cir., 1984) 926-927 (Judge Wilkey). 
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between two concurrent proceedings.25F25 A third technique which may be utilised in dealing with 
closely related proceedings is that of consolidation, so as to enable claims concerned with 
substantially the same underlying facts, but perhaps involving different parties, to be litigated once 
in a single forum.26F26 A jurisdiction agreement is an expression of the principle of party autonomy 
which gives precedence to the joint will of the parties in relation to choice of forum.27F27 Thus the 
mutual agreement of the parties ensures to a large degree that the choice of forum will be respected 
by the parties and upheld by the courts. A fifth set of techniques for dealing with parallel litigation is 
to confer upon the court the discretion to decline jurisdiction in favour of the courts of another 
State.28F28 Another possible technique is to restrain the parties from pursuing parallel litigation in 
another court or tribunal by issuing an anti-suit injunction.29F29  
 Having identified the different approaches used to control or manage the incidence of 
concurrent proceedings, it is now time to examine the European Union law of international civil 
procedure and the enforcement of party autonomy within that multilateral jurisdiction and 
judgments framework. 
 
D. Party autonomy and its enforcement in the EU: the overarching mutual trust principle reins in 
the pragmatic spirit of the English common law of conflict of laws  
The Alexandros T litigation in the English courts should be viewed in the wider context of the 
collective impact of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s30F30 landmark decisions in Gasser v 
MISAT,31F31 Turner v Grovit32F32 and West Tankers.33F33 These rulings have meant that jurisdictional party 
autonomy and its enforcement in the EU have suffered a major setback. The predominantly civilian 
CJEU administers and interprets a largely ‘closed system’ multilateral jurisdiction and judgments 
regime which accords primacy to the overarching principle of mutual trust and systemic order over 
and above the provision of substantive justice to the litigant in the individual case.34F34 The notorious 
decision in Gasser confirmed that the strict, automatic, blind and first come first served lis pendens 
rule enshrined in Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation prevails over the choice of court agreement 
25Art II (3) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (New York 
Convention) (signed 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959) 330 UNTS 38; Art 27 of the Brussels I 
Regulation; Art 29 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
26Art 6 of the Brussels I Regulation; Art 8 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
27Art 23 of the Brussels I Regulation; Art 25 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast); Art 5 of the Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements (30 June 2005) in R A Brand and P Herrup, The 2005 Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements, Commentary and Documents (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
28 The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens as enunciated in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd 
[1987] AC 460, [1986] 3 All ER 843; Art 28 of the Brussels I Regulation; Art 30 of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Recast). 
29Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119. 
30‘CJEU’ formerly the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
31Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693. 
32Case C 159/02 Turner v Grovit EU:C:2004:228, [2005] 1 AC 101. 
33Case C 185/07 West Tankers EU:C:2009:69, [2009] 1 AC 1138. 
34T C Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments: The Revised 
Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention and the Hague Convention (Oxford University Press, 2013) 12, 
para 1.28; R A Brand, Transaction Planning Using Rules on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments (Martinus Nijhoff, 2014) Chapter IV, 212-229; T C Hartley, “The European Union and the Systematic 
Dismantling of the Common Law of Conflict of Laws” (2005) International and Comparative Law Quarterly  813. 
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provision in Article 23 of the same Regulation.35F35 In Turner v Grovit and then West Tankers, the CJEU 
has held that the legal technique used by the English courts to prevent a party from commencing or 
continuing proceedings in breach of a jurisdiction or arbitration agreement, the anti-suit injunction, 
could not be granted in circumstances in which the foreign proceedings are before the courts of 
another EU Member State and are within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. In both rulings the 
CJEU held that anti-suit injunctions offend the principle of ‘mutual trust’36F36 enshrined in the Brussels I 
Regulation. Essentially, it is a question of whether the institutional value of harmony between courts 
should prevail over the more personal value of justice in the individual case.37F37 From a civil law 
perspective, the widely adhered to English common law criticisms of the troika of CJEU decisions are 
mitigated largely due to the prevalence of a “paradigmatically”38F38 or “fundamentally”39F39 different 
jurisdictional regime.40F40 A jurisdictional regime which incorporates a strict priority based lis pendens 
mechanism to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction and where jurisdiction is primarily a matter for the 
multilateral allocation of regulatory authority between states rather than the enforcement of the 
domestic private law rights and obligations of the parties to the litigation.41F41 A difference of 
perspective, however, does not detract from the universally perceived shortcoming of the Brussels I 
Regulation that it does not adequately protect jurisdiction agreements from the threat of pre-
emptive torpedo actions.42F42          
 The precedence of the lis pendens rule over the choice of court agreement provision in the 
scheme of the Brussels I Regulation has been abused by the commencement of ‘torpedo’43F43 style 
tactical litigation where a party pre-empts litigation for the positive assertion of liability by 
commencing proceedings for negative declaratory relief in a Member State court with a slow moving 
civil justice system. Under the lis pendens rule of the Brussels I Regulation a positive assertion of 
liability in one Member State and a claim for negative declaratory relief in another Member State 
constitute the ‘same cause of action’ for the purposes of Article 27.44F44 The preclusion of proceedings 
in the court second seised or the nominated court in an exclusive jurisdiction agreement until the 
time the court first seised declines jurisdiction is exacerbated by the fact that the civil justice systems 
35See Jonathan Mance, “Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements and European Ideals” (2004) Law Quarterly Review 
357. 
36“the convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to one another’s legal 
systems and judicial institutions’ and ‘a prohibition imposed by a court, backed by a penalty, restraining a 
party from commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court undermines the latter court’s 
jurisdiction to determine the dispute”: Turner v Grovit (supra n 31) [24] and [27]; See F Blobel and P Späth, 
“The Tale of Multilateral Trust and the European Law of Civil Procedure” (2005) European Law Review 528. 
37T C Hartley, ‘Antisuit Injunctions and the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgment Convention” (2000) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 166, 171. 
38R Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ (2006) Michigan Journal of International Law 1003. 
39J Harris, ‘Understanding the English Response to the Europeanisation of Private International Law’ (2008) 
Journal of Private International Law 347, 352-353. 
40See A Gardella & L G Radicati Di Brozolo, “Civil Law, Common Law and Market Integration: The EC Approach 
to Conflicts of Jurisdiction” (2003) American Journal of Comparative Law 611. 
41Harris, supra n 39, 372-374. 
42B Hess, T Pfeiffer and P Schlosser, The Brussels I Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, The Heidelberg Report on the 
Application of Regulation Brussels I in 25 Member States (Study JLS/C4/2005/03) (Verlag CH Beck, 2008) [388], 
112. 
43See M Franzosi, “Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo” (1997) European Intellectual Property 
Review 382. 
44 Case 144/86 Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v Palumbo [1987] ECR 4861; Case C-406/92 The Tatry 
EU:C:1994:400, [1999] QB 515. 
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of some Member States suffer from protracted delays45F45 and it may take many years for a court to 
adjudicate on the issue of jurisdiction.46F46 Moreover, the lack of a preliminary procedure for the 
separate assessment of jurisdictional issues in some Member States contributes to the delays, which 
are imminent in a civil procedural regime which assesses jurisdictional issues and the substantive 
claim on the merits simultaneously.47F47 The anti-suit injunction was a pragmatic remedy which could 
have been employed to restrain the claimant in the court first seised from commencing or 
continuing with proceedings in breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction agreement. However, the 
court first seised rule coupled with the cardinal principle of mutual trust have conferred on the 
courts of all Member States equality in the determination of procedural jurisdiction (kompetenz-
kompetenz).48F48 As a consequence, jurisdictional party autonomy in the European Union has been 
compromised. The nominated court in an exclusive choice of court agreement can only exercise 
jurisdiction once the court first seised has declined jurisdiction. If the court first seised has declared 
the choice of court agreement invalid or ineffective, the resulting judgment may be recognized in 
other Member States under Chapter III of the Brussels I Regulation.49F49 
 Following the prohibition of anti-suit injunctions within the European Union, the damages 
remedy for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements has presented itself as a likely contender in 
the scheme of techniques for the control of parallel litigation.50F50 Declaratory relief can also be relied 
45See A Dickinson, “A Charter for Tactical Litigation in Europe? Turner v Grovit” [2004] Lloyds Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 273, 278-280: Professor Dickinson states that in reports completed in 2003 on the 
judicial systems of seven of the 10 accession states, the EU Commission identified difficulties in various areas, 
including the length of judicial proceedings, public confidence in the judiciary and judicial corruption. Thus, the 
mutual trust principle may open avenues for abuse and tactical litigation as the ground realities in the courts 
of the EU Member States vary considerably. See ‘2003 Monitoring Reports for Accession States Prepared by 
the EU Commission’ (Europa.eu) <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/index.htm> 
accessed 15 December 2014. 
46See Case C-159/97 Transport Castelletti v Hugo Trumpy [1999] ECR I-1597: The Italian court in this case took 
eight years to adjudicate on the issue of jurisdiction. 
47Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser, supra n 42, [170]-[171], 49-50. 
48In a contract with a dispute resolution agreement, the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz specifically means 
that the chosen forum should have the competence to decide its own jurisdiction. See McLachlan (supra n 17) 
46-48; Z S Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International Commercial Law (Routledge, 2014) 
74-82. 
49Art 33 of the Brussels I Regulation; cf S 32 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982: Overseas 
judgments given in proceedings brought in breach of agreement for settlement of disputes shall not be 
recognized or enforced in the United Kingdom. 
50Donohue v. Armco Inc. [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill at [36], Lord Hobhouse 
of Woodborough at [48] and Lord Scott of Foscote at [75]); Union Discount Co Ltd v Zoller and Others [2001] 
EWCA Civ 1755, [2002] 1 WLR 1517 (Schiemann LJ); For the development of the idea of the damages remedy 
for breach of jurisdiction agreements in the writings of the pre-eminent English academic proponent, see, A 
Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) Chapter 8; A Briggs, “Anti-
suit Injunctions and Utopian Ideals” (2004) Law Quarterly Review 529, 532; A Briggs, “Decisions of British 
Courts during 2001 involving Questions of Private International Law” (2001) British Yearbook of International 
Law 437, 446-452; The Spanish Tribunal Supremo has also granted damages for breach of a Spanish choice of 
court agreement in a case outside the scope of the Brussels I Regulation: Sogo USA Inc v Angel Jesus, STS (Sala 
de lo Civil, Sección 1ª), 12 January 2009, Repertorio de Jurisprudencia 2009/544; see S Alvarez Gonzalez, “The 
Spanish Tribunal Supremo Grants Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement” [2009] IPRax 529; S 
Sanchez Fernandez, ‘Choice of Court Agreements: Breach and Damages within the Brussels I Regime’ (2010) 
Yearbook of Private International Law 377, 382-385; For discussion of the debate about the classification and 
enforcement of choice of court agreements via damages for breach of such agreements in the German legal 
system, see, U Magnus and P Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation (2nd ed, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012) 
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upon in the changing legal landscape of the EU to thwart the recognition and enforcement of a 
competing judgment from the courts of another Member State obtained in breach of an English 
arbitration agreement.51F51 Therefore, claims for declarations and damages for breach of exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements can be considered to be innovative alternatives to the now defunct anti-suit 
injunctions. 
 Undoubtedly, the enforcement of party autonomy in the EU has suffered a major blow by 
the decommissioning of the anti-suit injunction. The existence of this precarious state of affairs 
brings us to the case of The Alexandros T, where both the lis pendens and the related actions 
provisions of the Brussels I Regulation were engaged in a dispute concerning the enforcement of 
English settlement and jurisdiction agreements. The next section will examine the concept animating 
Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation and serve as an effective prelude to the discussion of 
the UK Supreme Court decision.  
 
E. The concept of Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation 
Articles 27 and 28 are part of Section 9 of Chapter II of the Brussels I Regulation and address the 
problem of irreconcilable judgments emanating from different Member States, by preventing those 
concurrent proceedings which have the potential to give rise to such judgments.52F52 In a sense, the 
strict rule of priority of actions enshrined in Article 27 and the race to the court house that it can 
encourage anticipates the race to judgment that the res judicata approach to tackling irreconcilable 
judgments at the recognition and enforcement stage can give rise to.53F53 In preventing concurrent 
proceedings which can give rise to irreconcilable judgments, both Articles 27 and 28 accord primacy 
to the court first seised of the proceedings and require proceedings in other courts to cease, by 
requiring the staying or dismissal of proceedings. 
 Articles 27 and 28 engage with different aspects or layers of the problem of irreconcilable 
judgments. Article 28 is concerned with the broader or more general problem of irreconcilable 
judgments, and in principle regulates all cases where there is the potential for inconsistent decisions 
originating in different Member States. In contrast, Article 27 is concerned with the narrower or 
511; U Magnus, “Choice of Court Agreements in the Review Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation” in E Lein 
(ed), The Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered (BIICL, 2012) 89-90; J Steinle and E Vasiliades, “The 
Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements under the Brussels I Regulation: Reconsidering the Principle of Party 
Autonomy” (2010) Journal of Private International Law 565, 575-580; F Sparka, Jurisdiction and Arbitration 
Clauses in Maritime Transport Documents: A Comparative Analysis (Springer, 2010) 81. 
51West Tankers Inc. v Allianz SpA [2011] EWHC 829 (Comm); West Tankers Inc. v Allianz SpA [2012] EWCA Civ. 
27. 
52See L Collins et al (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2012) 
570-583; J J Fawcett and J M Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (14th edn, 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 303-315; A Briggs and P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (5th edn, Informa 
Law, 2009) 311-343; P R Beaumont and P E McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law (3rd edn, SULI/W 
Green, 2011) 351-359; R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2010) 421-
452; R Fentiman in Magnus and Mankowski (eds), Brussels I Regulation (supra n 50) Arts 27-30, 558-560; 
McLachlan (supra n 17) 111-117; J Hill and A Chong, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of 
Laws in English Courts (4th edn, Hart Publishing, 2010) 274-291; A Layton and H Mercer (eds), European Civil 
Practice (Volume 1, 2nd edn, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) 770-815. 
53For the ‘anticipatory res judicata’ justification for the lis pendens doctrine, See McLachlan (supra n 17) 88. 
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more specific problem of irreconcilable judgments which compete for enforcement within Chapter 
III of the Brussels I Regulation. Article 27 is in effect aimed at preventing conflicting judgments with 
mutually exclusive legal effects and Article 28 applies to inconsistent judgments which reach 
different conclusions but are legally compatible. Article 27 is thus an aspect of the Brussels I 
Regulation’s regime for the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments between Member 
States. On the other hand, Article 28 serves the broader goal of ensuring the coordination of the 
exercise of adjudicatory authority in the EU, and promoting uniform decisions. Thus, Article 27 
regulates a particular aspect of a more general problem addressed by Article 28. 
 Articles 27 and 28 seek to avoid irreconcilable judgments by identifying and controlling those 
cases involving parallel proceedings in which the problem is likely to occur. Article 27 avoids 
conflicting judgments by regulating cases where the two sets of proceedings are legally congruent: 
those in which the proceedings have the same legal objective, and so may result in competing orders 
or awards. Article 28 avoids inconsistent judgments by regulating proceedings that are merely 
related: those in which the legal issues are the same, although there is no risk of a competition for 
enforcement, because the legal objectives are different. 
 Article 27 gives priority to the court first seised in two ways: by requiring (not merely 
permitting) the second court to decline jurisdiction if the first court asserts jurisdiction; and by 
requiring the second court to stay its proceedings to allow the first court to determine its 
competence. Article 28 permits (but does not require), the second court to stay its proceedings 
whenever there are related proceedings in two States, and to decline jurisdiction if both actions may 
be consolidated in the first court. 
 Articles 27 and 28 govern the procedure of the second court, except when the second court 
has exclusive jurisdiction under Article 22.54F54 However, exclusive jurisdiction under Article 23 does 
not affect the operation of Articles 27.55F55 Under Article 27 the second court has no choice but to 
desist, if the preconditions for staying or dismissing proceedings are satisfied. By contrast, Article 28 
confers upon the second court discretion to stay or dismiss proceedings. Arguably, there may be in 
effect a presumption that the second proceeding should cease,56F56 but the second court may choose 
to allow its proceedings to continue, if it considers that the ‘presumption’ in favour of the court first 
seised is rebutted. 
 Articles 27 and 28 do not confer substantive jurisdiction or jurisdiction on the merits of the 
claim upon the court first seised. They merely regulate the behaviour of the court second seised. 
Nevertheless, they confer upon the court first seised sole competence to determine in which 
Member State proceedings should be brought, except where the court second seised has exclusive 
jurisdiction under Article 22. If the court first seised asserts jurisdiction, no other court may hear the 
case. If it does not, only then may the second court consider its own jurisdiction – only if the first 
54Case C-438/12 Weber v Weber EU:C:2014:212, [56]; [2014] WLR (D) 165; Where the court second seised has 
exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Art 22 (Art 24 of the Recast Regulation) a judgment issued by a court in 
another Member State is also bound to be refused recognition if an application is made for refusal of its 
enforcement, see A Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press, 2014)  308. 
55Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser v. MISAT Srl. [2003] ECR I-14693; The Brussels I Regulation Recast has created an 
exception to the general lis pendens rule in cases where the court second seised is nominated by an exclusive 
choice of court agreement: See Recital 22 and Arts 29(1) and 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast. 
56Case C-129/92 Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco EU:C:1994:13, [1994] QB 509. 
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court declines, may the second court assert jurisdiction. In that sense, Articles 27 and 28 confer 
procedural jurisdiction upon the first court (‘jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction’57F57). 
 The operation of Articles 27 and 28 is facilitated by a provision, which autonomously defines 
the time at which a court becomes seised as that at which the first legally relevant step in the 
proceedings is taken.58F58 
 Having identified and considered the theoretical legal basis and concept underlying Articles 
27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation, the time is ripe to turn towards an examination of the 
decision of the UK Supreme Court in The Alexandros T within the context of the existing judicial and 
academic authorities. An in depth discussion of the legal issues raised by the case will be 
interspersed with the implications of the decision for the most appropriate approach to adopt in the 
control and management of parallel proceedings, the increased potential risk of irreconcilable 
judgments, the augmentation of jurisdictional party autonomy in cases of European Union lis 
pendens and the possible emergence of new tactical ploys in the European Union law of 
international civil procedure.   
 
F. Article 27 issues in The Alexandros T: introduction 
In relation to Article 27, the issues for determination before the UK Supreme Court were whether 
the proceedings in Greece and the proceedings in England involved ‘the same cause of action’, which 
court was the court first seised and the late reliance by the respondents on Article 27. At the outset, 
it should be noted that the CJEU has held that the principles developed in its jurisprudence with 
regard to Articles 21 and 22 of the Brussels Convention59F59 apply equally to Articles 27 and 28 of the 
Brussels I Regulation.60F60  
 The purpose of Article 27 is to prevent the courts of two Member States from giving 
conflicting judgments and to preclude, so far as possible, the non-recognition of a judgment on the 
ground that it is irreconcilable with a judgment given by the court of another Member State.61F61 
Therefore, Article 27 anticipates and lessens the need for recourse to the preclusive provisions 
under Articles 34(3) and (4) of the Brussels I Regulation at the recognition and enforcement of 
57 Also referred to as ‘kompetenz-kompetenz’ (in the German language) or ‘competence-competence’: See 
McLachlan (supra n 17) 46-48; Tang (supra n 48). 
58Art 30 of the Brussels I Regulation (Art 32 of the Recast Regulation) and Recital 15 of the Brussels I 
Regulation. Under the Brussels Convention a court was considered to be seised of proceedings on the date on 
which, according to its own national civil procedural law, the proceedings before it could be said to be 
definitively pending. See Briggs, supra n 54, 302-303.  
59Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels 
Convention/ Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention) (Brussels, 27 September 1968). 
60Case C-133/11 Folien Fischer AG v Ritrama SpA EU:C:2012:664; [2013] QB 523, [31] and [32]; The Brussels 
Convention, the Brussels I Regulation and the Recast Regulation should be regarded as evolving versions of the 
same instrument to ensure the continuity of the law: Recital 19 of the Brussels I Regulation and Recital 34 of 
the Brussels I Regulation Recast; See E B Crawford and J M Carruthers, “Connection and Coherence Between 
and Among European Instruments in the Private International Law of Obligations” (2014) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
61Case 144/86 Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v Palumbo [1987] ECR 4861, [8].  
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judgments stage.62F62 The objective of Article 28 is to improve coordination of the exercise of judicial 
functions within the European Union and to avoid conflicting and contradictory decisions, thus 
facilitating the proper administration of justice.63F63    
 
G. Article 27 issues in The Alexandros T: “same cause of action” 
Lord Clarke, delivering the majority judgment in The Alexandros T, first addressed the question of 
whether the English and the Greek proceedings share the same cause or causes of action. This 
section will examine the state of the judicial and academic authorities on the ‘same cause of action’ 
issue, discuss the decision of the UK Supreme Court on the point and then proceed to analyse the 
contribution of the decision in The Alexandros T to the appropriate approach to be adopted when 
interpreting the ‘same cause of action’ in Article 27. 
 The phrase ‘same cause of action’ in Article 27 has an independent and autonomous 
meaning as a matter of European Union law and it is thus not to be interpreted according to the 
criteria of national law.64F64 It is submitted that the application of Article 27 gives rise to a problem of 
characterization.65F65 Before a court can decide whether the two sets of proceedings share a common 
‘cause of action’, the court must identify the basis and objective of each action. In effect, the court 
must characterize both actions so as to identify their essential features. This can be a challenging 
exercise, because the manner in which each action has proceeded under the local law of the 
Member State in question might disguise its essential features. Differences in form and procedure 
may hide the essential similarity between different actions. Keeping these considerations in mind, 
the adoption of an autonomous pan European or internationalist approach to the characterization of 
the respective causes of action is better suited for the purposes of the uniform application of Article 
27 than reliance on parochial concepts rooted in the idiosyncrasies of national law. The development 
and subsequent refinement of autonomous European causes of action encouraged by the 
application of Article 27 may thus also lead to a degree of convergence between the diverse legal 
systems of the EU Member States and their substantive private law regimes. The CJEU has 
approached the ‘same cause of action’ issue by seeking to ignore the differences under local law and 
procedure and focussing on the essence of each action.66F66  
 In order for proceedings to involve the same cause of action they must have ‘’le même objet 
et la même cause”.67F67 This expression derives from the French language version of the Brussels I 
Regulation text and is not reflected expressly in the English or German language texts. However, the 
CJEU has held that the French language version of the text which incorporates a separation of ‘cause 
62For the ‘anticipatory res judicata’ rationale for the lis pendens doctrine, see McLachlan (supra n 17) 88. 
63Case C-406/92 The Tatry EU:C:1994:400, [1999] QB 515, [32], [52] and [55]; Sarrio SA v Kuwait Investment 
Authority [1999] 1 AC 32, 39F-H (Lord Saville).  
64Case 144/86 Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v Palumbo [1987] ECR 4861, [11]. 
65Fentiman, Brussels I Regulation (supra n 52) 589-590; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (supra n 
52) 439; McLachlan (supra n 17) 123-127. 
66See Case C-406/92 The Tatry EU:C:1994:400, [1999] QB 515: An action in rem and an action in personam 
were held to have the ‘same cause of action’ for the purposes of Art 27. The classification of a claim under 
national law is not material for the purposes of establishing identity of object and identity of cause. 
67‘’le meme objet et la meme cause” (French) Translation: “the same object and the same cause”; see Briggs, 
(supra n 54) 310-311. 
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of action’ into le même objet et la même cause applies generally.68F68 Identity of cause means that the 
proceedings in each jurisdiction must have the same facts and rules of law relied upon as the basis 
for the action.69F69 The cause of action refers to the juridical basis of the claim in this case. Identity of 
object means that the proceedings in each jurisdiction must have the same end in view.70F70 In other 
words, the object of an action is its legal purpose which is defined by reference to the intended legal 
outcome. The strategic intentions or underlying motives of the parties are of no relevance. The 
assessment of identity of cause and identity of object is to be made by reference only to the claims 
in each action and not to the defences to those claims.71F71  
 In the course of the judgment, Lord Clarke cites Rix J, as he then was, in Glencore 
International AG v Shell International Trading and Shipping Co Ltd72F72 as having summarized the 
approach to the ‘same cause of action’ issue clearly and accurately.73F73 According to this approach, 
the tripartite requirements of the same parties, the same cause and the same object ensure that 
Article 27 is engaged in relatively straightforward situations where the individual claims are mirror 
images of one another. Article 28 with its more flexible discretionary power to stay is available in the 
case of related proceedings which need not involve the strict triple requirement of Article 27. 
Therefore, there is no need to fit a case into the demanding rubric of Article 27 where Article 28 is 
available as an alternative in case of related proceedings.  
 At this juncture, it is significant to note that there are alternative approaches to interpreting 
the ‘same cause of action’ requirement in Article 27. Fentiman argues that a common object or 
subject matter may be in practice the only requirement for the operation of Article 27, apart from 
the same parties.74F74 Therefore, the additional requirement of common cause is subsumed by the 
requirement of a common subject matter or object. The possibility that the object or subject matter 
is at root the only necessary requirement is alluded to by the CJEU in Gantner.75F75 Fentiman bases his 
conceptual approach to the issue on the observation that proceedings having a common objective or 
subject matter are bound to share a common legal and factual basis, while those not having a 
common legal objective inevitably fall outside Article 27. Another, arguably more radical, approach 
to the issue would be to shift the focus from the congruence between the proceedings to whether 
the proceedings are likely to give rise to conflicting judgments.76F76     
68 Case C-144/86 Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v Palumbo [1987] ECR 4861, [14]; Case C-406/92 The Tatry 
EU:C:1994:400, [1999] QB 515, [38]; Underwriting Members of Lloyd’s Syndicate 980 v Sinco SA [2009] Lloyd's 
Rep IR 365, [24] (Beatson J). 
69Case C-406/92 EU:C:1994:400, The Tatry [1999] QB 515, [39]. 
70 Case C-406/92 The Tatry EU:C:1994:400, [1999] QB 515, [41]; Case C-111/01 Gantner Electronic GmbH v 
Basch Exploitatie Maatschappij BV [2003] ECR I-4207, [25]; JP Morgan Europe Ltd v Primacom AG [2005] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 665, [42]; Underwriting Members of Lloyd’s Syndicate 980 v Sinco SA [2009] Lloyd's Rep IR 365, 
[24]. 
71Case C-111/01 Gantner Electronic GmbH v Basch Exploitatie Maatschappij BV [2003] ECR I-4207, [24]-[32]; 
See also to similar effect Kolden Holdings Ltd v Rodette Commerce Ltd [2008] 1 Lloyd's Rep 434, [93] (Lawrence 
Collins LJ) and Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto Corporation [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 560, [36] (Mummery LJ). 
72[1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 692, 697. 
73The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70; [2014] 1 All ER 590; [2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 223, [28(VII)] (Lord Clarke). 
74Fentiman, Brussels I Regulation (n 52) 586-588; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (supra n 52) 
438-439. 
75Case C-111/01 Gantner Electronic GmbH v Basch Exploitatie Maatschappij BV [2003] ECR I-4207, [25]. 
76Fentiman, Brussels I Regulation (supra n 52) 588. 
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 The essential question facing the UK Supreme Court was whether the claims in England and 
Greece were mirror images of one another and thus legally irreconcilable. For the purposes of 
comparing the individual causes of actions, the UK Supreme Court considered the insurers’ claims 
under three heads: indemnity, exclusive jurisdiction and release. 
 The insurers argued that the Greek proceedings had breached the indemnity clauses in the 
settlement agreements and that they were entitled to be indemnified against the consequences of 
those proceedings. Lord Clarke determined in relation to cause that the claims in Greece are claims 
in tort and the claim for an indemnity in England was a claim in contract. In relation to object, the 
object of the Greek proceedings was to establish liability under Greek law akin to tort whereas the 
object of the insurers’ claim in England was to establish a right to be indemnified in respect of such a 
liability. Therefore, Lord Clarke concluded that the respective causes of action had neither the same 
object nor the same cause. 
 Lord Clarke next considered the insurers claim that the respondents had commenced the 
proceedings in Greece in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction agreements in the settlement 
agreements and in the insurance policies. The settlement agreements provided that they were 
subject to English law and the jurisdiction of the High Court in London. The insurers claim that they 
are entitled to damages for breach of the exclusive jurisdiction agreements and also sought a 
declaration that the claims in the Greek proceedings fell within the scope of the settlement 
agreement. There is an established line of judicial precedent in English law to the effect that claims 
based on an alleged breach of an exclusive jurisdiction or an arbitration agreement are different 
causes of action from claims for substantive relief based on a breach of the underlying contract.77F77 
The existence of judicial authority on the issue, lends support to the conclusion that the claims of the 
insurers in England for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements in the insurance policies and in 
the settlement agreements do not involve the same cause of action as the respondent’s claims in 
tort in the Greek proceedings. 
 A majority of the Supreme Court (Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance dissenting on the 
declaration that the Greek claims had been settled) held that the insurers’ claim for a declaration 
that the Greek claims fell within the terms of the settlement agreement and that they were entitled 
to a declaration that the bringing of those claims was a breach of the agreement and that they were 
entitled to damages for that breach did not have the same cause of action as the Greek proceedings. 
Again the Greek claims were claims in tort and these were contractual claims. The factual bases for 
the two claims were entirely different and the object of the two claims was different. 
 By holding that Article 27 did not apply to any of the causes of action advanced by or against 
the insurers, Lord Clarke arrived at a different conclusion on the ‘same cause of action’ issue from 
that of Longmore LJ in the Court of Appeal. It is submitted that, the conceptual approach adopted by 
the Court of Appeal to the ‘same cause of action’ issue is the root cause of the divergence in the 
rulings. The Court of Appeal conceptualized the issue of the ‘same cause of action’ from a broader 
77Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, 595H-596C (Steyn LJ) (giving the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal); Alfred C Toepfer International GmbH v Molino Boschi Sarl [1996] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 510, 513 (Mance J); Toepfer International GmbH v Société Cargill France [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 98, 106 
(Colman J); Sinco, [50] and[54] (Beatson J); WMS Gaming Inc v Benedetti Plus Giocolegale Ltd [2011] EWHC 
2620 (Comm), [32] (Simon J).  
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perspective focussing on the overall result in each jurisdiction.78F78 A broad approach risks neglecting 
an examination of the individual claims made in each jurisdiction to ascertain whether there is an 
identity of cause and an identity of object and is not consistent with the principles laid down by the 
CJEU. As noted above, the defences advanced in each jurisdiction are of no consequence in this 
comparative exercise. A fundamental distinction between Article 27 and Article 28 is that the former 
involves a comparison between causes of action within the different sets of proceedings or actions 
whereas the latter is concerned with entire actions or proceedings themselves. In paragraph 48, 
Longmore LJ recognized that there were causes of action in the English proceedings which are not 
exactly mirror images of the allegations in the Greek proceedings but said that, to the extent that 
they are not, “they are essentially the same in the sense that the key assertion in Greece is that 
there are non-contractual claims and the key assertion in England is that those non-contractual 
claims have been compromised by the settlement agreements”.79F79 The focus in the Court of Appeal 
was on the nature of settlement agreements as a defence to the Greek action in tort, which is 
irrelevant. The irrelevance of the defences in each set of proceedings lends support to a narrower 
construction of the ‘same cause of action’ in Article 27 and that the analysis cannot involve a broad 
comparison of what each party ultimately hopes to achieve. The analysis simply involves a 
comparison between the individual claims in order to see whether they have the same cause and 
the same object. 
 Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance took a different view of the applicability of Article 27 to the 
insurers’ claim for a declaration that the claims in the Greek proceedings had been released by the 
settlement agreement. They considered that Article 27 was applicable in this case. In Lord 
Neuberger’s view, if the Greek court were to uphold Starlight’s claim and the English court were to 
grant the insurers a declaration that the claim had in fact been settled, the two judgments would be 
logically incompatible.80F80 This was conceptually different from the insurers’ claim for an indemnity, 
which would only be commercially but not logically inconsistent with any Greek judgment in favour 
of Starlight. The former, but not the latter aspect of the insurers’ claim therefore fell within Article 
27.  
 In Lord Mance’s view, the English claims for a declaration that the Greek claims had been 
settled or were compromised within the terms of the release were mirror images of the Greek tort 
claims as one asserted and the other denied the existence of liability.81F81 Thus, they had the same 
cause of action. As to the same object, Lord Mance held that the end that the Greek and English 
proceedings had in view was the same in each case i.e. to decide the issue of liability for the torts 
alleged in Greece. The issue of liability was central to both sets of proceedings and if both sets of 
proceedings were pursued to judgment it would lead to judgments which were legally and directly 
incompatible. In such a situation, Article 27 would apply. 
 Thus, the UK Supreme Court decision in the Alexandros T validated a narrow construction of 
Article 27 by focussing on the tripartite test involving the same cause, the same object and the same 
78[2012] EWCA Civ 1714; [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 217, [47]-[50] (Longmore LJ). 
79Ibid, [48] (Longmore LJ). 
80[2013] UKSC 70, [128]-[132] (Lord Neuberger); Lord Neuberger referred to the majority’s view that the 
English declaration claims did not fall under Art 27 as giving the expression le même objet et la meme cause a 
“very narrow effect”.  
81[2013] UKSC 70, [142]-[143] (Lord Mance). 
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parties. Individual claims in each jurisdiction were compared to determine identity of cause and 
object, without reference to the defences. Broad brush interpretations concerning the overall result 
in each jurisdiction were held to be inconsistent with the principles laid down by the CJEU. Similarly, 
it is submitted that an approach focussed on avoiding the threat of irreconcilable judgments rather 
than on the extent of congruence between each set of proceedings is not in consonance with the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU. The emphasis on the extent of congruence between each set of 
proceedings and not on avoiding the threat of irreconcilable judgments seems to suggest that the 
risk of contradictory judgments has deliberately not been eliminated by the CJEU’s interpretation of 
Article 27.82F82 In summation, the broader interpretations of the ‘same cause of action’ seem to lack 
the necessary ‘gravitational force’83F83 and are not in agreement with the letter and spirit of Article 27 
as interpreted by the CJEU. 
 The UK Supreme Court’s decision is undoubtedly imbued with the pragmatic spirit of the 
English common law dispensing substantive justice in the individual case. However, it may be argued 
that, the majority’s decision does not adequately address the larger systemic issue of the threat of 
irreconcilable judgments, which the lis pendens provisions in the Brussels I Regulation are designed 
to curb from the very outset. The majority’s very narrow or perhaps ‘semantic’ construction of the 
‘same cause of action’ under Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation militates against an autonomous 
and enlightened comparative law approach to characterization of the ‘same cause of action’ which 
would focus on the fundamental natures of the underlying causes of action rather than attributing 
significance to superficial or linguistic differences of form and idiom.84F84 In view of the autonomous 
definition of ‘cause of action’ in the Brussels I Regulation, the majority’s characterization of the 
reason for denial of liability as the ‘contractual’ settlement agreement becomes irrelevant. The 
distinction drawn between the Greek ‘tortious’ and English ‘contractual’ claims by the majority in 
relation to the insurers’ claim for a declaration that the Greek claims fell within the terms of the 
settlement agreement (essentially a declaration of non-liability) was therefore concealing the same 
underlying cause of action. For instance, in The Tatry, an action in rem and an action in personam 
were held to have the ‘same cause of action’ for the purposes of Article 27.        
 In light of the different views on whether Article 27 applied to the claims for a declaration 
that the Greek claims fell within the terms of the release in the settlement agreements or that under 
the agreements the tort claims had been settled, which was similar to the claims being essentially 
for declarations for non-liability, Lord Clarke held that, unless the insurers abandoned any claim for a 
82Collins et al (eds.), supra n 52, 577; There is evidence of recognition of this narrow approach to Art 27 in the 
preclusive recognition and enforcement provisions under Arts 34(3) and 34(4) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
83See R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) Chapter 4 ‘Hard Cases’; ‘Gravitational 
force’ here refers to the pull or tension exerted by previous decisions of the CJEU on current decisions and on 
the eventual course the law will take. For the development of a de facto principle of precedent of EU law at 
the CJEU see: K McAuliffe, “Precedent at the Court of Justice of the European Union: The Linguistic Aspect” 
(2013) Law and Language, Current Legal Issues Forthcoming (SSRN): <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2208710> 
accessed 15 December 2014. 
84 For a discussion of the instrumental approach adopted by the English courts when applying Art 27 in relation 




                                                          
declaration of non-liability, the question whether those claims involved the same cause of action as 
the claims in Greece within the meaning of Article 27 should be referred to the CJEU.85F85 
 
H. Article 27 issues in The Alexandros T: seisin under Article 27 
If it was determined that the declaratory relief pursued in the English courts (seised in 2011) and the 
Greek claims share the same cause of action, the question of which court was first seised becomes 
crucial for the operation of Article 27. Lord Clarke considered the issue briefly because if the 
appellants persisted in their claims for declarations and the issue became critical for the resolution 
of the appeal, the proper course would be to refer the question to the CJEU. 
 The Supreme Court observed that a court is only seised of claims by or against new parties 
from the date that those parties are added to the proceedings.86F86 However, the more challenging 
question is whether the court first seised remains so where the proceedings are subsequently 
amended by the addition of new claims. It is submitted that the court should be seised of the 
proceedings in relation to the amendment from the date of the amendment and not from the time 
of the institution of the original proceedings. 
 The transitional provisions of Article 66 of the Brussels I Regulation support the proposition 
that proceedings have only one date upon which they are instituted and are inconsistent with the 
idea that they can have several such dates as and when new claims are added by amendment. The 
appellants recognised that for the purposes of deciding whether there is the same cause of action 
the court must look to the claims made but for the purposes of deciding which court is deemed to be 
first seised under Article 27, the autonomous test in Article 30 is to be applied. There is no mention 
of causes of action in Article 30 and the word proceedings is used twice in Article 27. Although, the 
word proceedings is not defined in the Brussels I Regulation, it appears nearly fifty times in the 
Regulation used as a word of general application. The usage of the word ‘proceedings’ in the 
Brussels I Regulation suggests that issues or causes of action or claims may change during the course 
of one single ‘procedural unit’87F87 of proceedings.  
 This approach possesses the merits of certainty and predictability but is far too simplistic 
and reductive to cater to the needs of the complex realities of international commercial litigation, 
where issues may crystallize over time. As new issues arise, whether or not linked to the original 
claim, a party will need to amend the claim to reflect the changing ground realities. There is 
considerable support in the judicial authorities and the leading English conflict of laws texts for the 
proposition that the new claims added to the 2006 proceedings, which were founded on the Greek 
proceedings and thus second in time, were new claims, that the English court should be regarded as 
seised of them only when they were added to the 2006 proceedings and that the Greek court was 
85Following the Supreme Court decision, the claim for a declaration that the claims made in the Greek courts 
fell within the terms of the release in the settlement agreement was abandoned by at least the CMI 
defendants: [2014] EWCA Civ 1010, [18] (Longmore LJ). 
86The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70, [60] (Lord Clarke); Briggs, supra n 54, 305. 
87See Case C-296/10 Purrucker v Vallez-Perez (No 2) [2010] ECR I-11163. 
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the first seised within the meaning of Article 27.88F88 Notwithstanding the argument to the contrary, 
Lord Clarke was unsure whether the existing case law and literature has effectively engaged with the 
issues arising from the language of the Brussels I Regulation.  
 The UK Supreme Court decided that this point was not acte clair and that a reference to the 
CJEU would be necessary if the court had to decide the point.89F89 
 
I. Article 27 issues in The  Alexandros T: too late to rely on Article 27? 
In the Commercial Court at first instance, Starlight had expressly disclaimed any intention to rely 
upon Article 27. The question before the Supreme Court was whether LMI could rely on this in 
response to the assured’s late attempt to rely upon Article 27 or whether, as the Court of Appeal 
had held, the latter was bound to consider Article 27 because it expressly provides that “any court 
other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the 
jurisdiction of the court first seised is established”. There is an express requirement in Article 27(1) 
that the second seised court shall of its own motion stay its proceedings.90F90 The wording of the 
provision clearly removes from the court the option, permitted by the Brussels Convention, of 
dismissing rather than staying the action,91F91 and ensures that a court can act in the absence of an 
application or motion by the defendant.92F92 However, the scope of the second court’s obligation to 
examine jurisdiction ex officio is uncertain.  
 Undoubtedly, a defendant may make such application to the court as national procedural 
law permits, even if the purpose of the application is to deny the forum of its jurisdiction by seeking 
a stay of proceedings. It has been suggested that, if the second court’s power to act ex officio is to 
have any substantial effect, it must at least be required to examine whether a stay is justified in any 
case where the circumstances suggest that Article 27 may be of relevance.93F93 However, to oblige a 
Member State court to examine each and every case before it for the possible application of Article 
27, would be impractical, burdensome and would probably go beyond what is required to give effect 
to the provision.94F94 The national procedural regimes of some Member States require courts to 
examine jurisdiction ex officio when their jurisdiction is invoked, if only perhaps in limited cases, 
such as those involving parties originating, or events occurring in other Member States. For instance, 
in English law service of process abroad in a case under the Brussels I Regulation is permitted only if 
88FKI Engineering Ltd v Stribog Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 3264, [84] (Rix LJ); Underwriting Members of Lloyd’s Syndicate 
980 v Sinco SA [2009] Lloyd's Rep IR 365, [61]-[68] (Beatson J); Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto Corporation 
[2007] EWHC 900 (Ch), [19] (Lewison J); Collins et al (eds), supra n 52, 574-580; Briggs and Rees, supra n 52, 
320-327; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (supra n 52), 433-434; Briggs, supra n 54, 305.   
89[2013] UKSC 70, [72] (Lord Clarke). 
90Schlosser Report on the Brussels Convention [1979] OJ C 59/71, 125, [181]; Briggs, supra n 54, 307.  
91See Layton and Mercer, supra n 52, 793-794. 
92For a discussion on the sua sponte application of choice of law rules and foreign law, see M Bogdan, Private 
International Law as Component of the Law of the Forum (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) Chapter VI, “Should Conflict 
Rules and Foreign Law Be Applied Ex Officio?”. 
93Jenard Report on the Brussels Convention [1979] OJ C 59/1, 41: “A court will not always have to examine of 
its own motion whether the same proceedings are pending in the courts of another country, but only when 
the circumstances are such as to lead the court to belive that this may be the case.” (Emphasis added to typo 
in the original text). 
94Layton and Mercer, supra n 52, 794; Fentiman, Brussels I Regulation (supra n 52), 590-591. 
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the claimant states that no proceedings are pending in another Member State.95F95 A procedural norm 
which militates against the ex officio examination of jurisdiction in the English courts is that the 
parties and not the courts are the masters of the dispute.96F96 This in turn raises the issue whether CPR 
Part 11 which specifies the procedure for an application by a defendant to dispute the court’s 
jurisdiction but does not make provision for a sua sponte examination of jurisdiction is consistent 
with the Brussels I Regulation.97F97 The inevitable operation of diverse national civil procedural laws in 
this area may compromise to some extent the uniform application of Article 27 of the Brussels I 
Regulation.98F98  
 The Supreme Court held that it was too late for Starlight to rely upon Article 27. The assured 
had not brought any claim on Article 27 within the procedural limits provided for by national law.99F99 
The judge at first instance had had an opportunity to consider Article 27. However, if it were 
necessary for the determination of the appeal, the question of the meaning and effect of the duty to 
consider Article 27 of its own motion should be referred to the CJEU.100F100 
 
J. Article 28 issues in The Alexandros T: introduction 
The exercise of discretion referred to in Article 28(1) applies to any court other than the court first 
seised. If the English court is the court first seised, it has no discretion to stay. Article 28 applies to 
related actions pending in the courts of different Member States and actions are deemed to be 
related where they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them 
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.101F101 The 
fact that the various proceedings are related proceedings for the purposes of Article 28 is not in 
dispute. The questions in need of determination were whether the actions were pending, whether 
the English court was the court first seised and if it was not, how the discretion should be exercised. 
 
K. Article 28 issues in The Alexandros T: Seisin under Article 28 
Lord Clarke stated that the correct approach for establishing seisin under Article 28 is “once you 
have found two related and pending actions and seek to stay one of them, invoking Article 28, which 
of the two courts was the first to achieve seisin of one or other of the actions?”102F102 The court first 
95CPR 6.19. 
96dominus litis (Latin: ‘master of the suit’) A person who has control over an action or other judicial proceeding 
and can dispose of it as he thinks fit. See Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (3rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2009). 
97Case C-365/88 Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH v Zeehaghe BV [1990] ECR I-1845, [19]-[20], ’the Court [CJEU] 
has consistently held that, as regards procedural rules, reference must be made to the national rules 
applicable by the national court’; cf However, ‘the application of national procedural rules may not impair the 
effectiveness of the Convention’; See X E Kramer, “Harmonisation of Civil Procedure and the Interaction with 
Private International Law” in X E Kramer & C H van Rhee (eds), Civil Litigation in a Globalising World (TMC 
Asser Press/Springer, 2012) 121. 
98Fentiman, Brussels I Regulation (supra n 52), 591. 
99Voluntary submission to jurisdiction at common law and deemed submission to jurisdiction under CPR 11. 
100[2013] UKSC 70, [123] (Lord Clarke). 
101Art 28(3) of the Brussels I Regulation; Art 30(3) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast. 
102FKI Engineering Ltd v Stribog Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 3264, [119] (Rix LJ). 
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seised means the court first seised of the action, meaning first seised of the proceedings, not of 
particular claims or causes of action. 
 Starlight argued that there was no related action pending in England when the Greek 
proceedings were commenced. In the alternative they say that, even if the 2006 proceedings were 
still alive, the English court was not first seised because the new claims now brought were entirely 
new claims, which should be equated with new proceedings. 
 The insurers argued that the 2006 proceedings were still on foot, and thus pending, having 
been stayed but not finally concluded. Lord Clarke agreed with the insurers on this point. In so far as 
the insurers were seeking to enforce the settlement agreements then the English court was first 
seised, as the 2006 proceedings were still on foot. They were “unstayed” for the purposes of 
carrying into effect the terms agreed. 
 For the parts of the action that were stayed under the Tomlin Orders103F103 (i.e. the claims for 
breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the policies of insurance, which do not depend on the 
terms of the settlement agreements), Lord Clarke, following Rofa Sport Management AG v DHLK 
International (UK) Ltd104F 104, found that, as the 2006 proceedings had not been dismissed or 
discontinued, the court remained seised of them. Lord Clarke rejected Starlight’s arguments that the 
new claims in the 2006 proceedings should be treated as new proceedings. In the context of Article 
28 it was wrong to ask which court was seised of a cause of action or claim, because Article 28 was 
concerned with related actions as a whole. Additionally, the “new” claims in the 2006 proceedings 
were not entirely new as they were unquestionably related to the original action. Hence Lord Clarke 
thought that the English court was first seised. 
 The appellants relied upon principles developed by the English courts as a matter of English 
law not European Union law. Lord Clarke considered this to be a permissible approach because 
Article 30 only provides for the circumstances in which a court is deemed to be seised but does not 
make express provision for the circumstances in which it ceases to be seised.105F105 
 On balance, Lord Clarke recognized the scope for argument on the point and consequently a 
potential reference to the CJEU. He therefore went on to consider the discretion to stay proceedings 
in the event that the English court was seised second. A preliminary reference to the CJEU on this 
issue was deemed to be unnecessary as even if the English court was second seised, it was decided 
that, the discretion to stay proceedings should not be exercised. 
103When a claim is settled it is common for the terms agreed to be recorded in the form of order known as a 
"Tomlin Order" as the form was originally devised by Mr Justice Tomlin; see Practice Note [1927] W.N. 290. 
The effect of the order is that the claim is stayed by consent of the parties and on terms scheduled to the 
order. The current usual wording of the order is as follows: "AND the Claimant and the Defendant having 
agreed to the terms set forth in the Schedule to this order IT IS ORDERED that all further proceedings in this 
claim be stayed except for the purpose of carrying those terms into effect and there is permission to apply for 
that purpose". Not being a judgment, no interest will be attracted by any money payment due under the 
scheduled terms unless specifically provided for. The judge will not normally inquire into the terms of the 
agreement which is a contract between the parties. See Noel v Becker (Practice Note) [1971] 1 WLR 355 (CA) 
(Davies, Edmund Davies and Karminski LJJ); CPR 40.6 on “Consent Judgments and Orders” in Lord Justice 
Jackson et al (eds), The White Book 2015 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015); See also, Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law 
(3rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2009). 
104[1989] 1 WLR 902. 
105Briggs, supra n 54, 305-306. 
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L. Article 28 issues in The Alexandros T: discretion under Article 28 
Based on the assumption that the English court is second seised for the purposes of Article 28, the 
question arose whether the action or actions should be stayed as a matter of discretion. A partial 
comparison may be drawn between Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation and the common law 
doctrine of forum non conveniens in this respect.106F106 However, the two techniques of controlling 
parallel proceedings differ as under Article 28 only the court second seised can exercise the 
discretion to stay proceedings and more significantly, natural forum considerations are absent from 
the Article 28 equation. The central issues engaged are the scope and nature of the discretion under 
Article 28. By synthesizing the language of Article 28, whereby a court has discretion to stay with the 
underlying ethos of procedural certainty, the most appropriate approach to the operation of Article 
28 is where a court has discretion not to stay proceedings but only in exceptional cases.107F107 There is 
support for this solution in the Jenard report, which states that in the event of related proceedings 
‘the first duty of the court is to stay its proceedings’.108F108 
 In Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco109F109, Advocate General Lenz identified a number of factors which 
could be relevant to the exercise of the discretion. In brief, the circumstances of each case are of 
particular importance but the aim of Article 28 is to avoid parallel proceedings and conflicting 
decisions. In case of doubt it would be appropriate to grant a stay. Indeed, AG Lenz appears to have 
approved the proposition that there is a strong presumption in favour of a stay. However, he 
identified three particular factors as being of importance: (1) the extent of the relatedness between 
the actions and the risk of mutually irreconcilable decisions; (2) the stage reached in each set of 
proceedings; and (3) the proximity of the courts to the subject matter of the case. In conclusion, the 
Advocate General said at para 79 that it goes without saying that in the exercise of the discretion 
regard may be had to the question of which court is in the best position to decide a given question. 
 A matter of particular significance concerns the exercise of the Article 28 discretion where 
the court second seised has jurisdiction pursuant to an agreement subject to Article 23. Although the 
true construction of the settlement agreements and the question whether Starlight is in breach of 
them was a matter for the Court of Appeal, there is a strong argument that the Greek proceedings 
have been brought by Starlight in breach of the settlement agreements, which were subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts and in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the 
insurance contracts. Therefore, there is a compelling and persuasive argument that the English 
courts are best placed to adjudicate on the matter. The exercise of the discretion not to stay 
106Von Mehren and Gottschalk (supra n 23) 317-318; Lis pendens is a factor to consider in determining the 
most appropriate forum for the purposes of the doctrine of forum non conveniens: R A Brand and S R 
Jablonski, Forum Non Conveniens: History, Global Practice, and Future Under the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements (Oxford University Press, 2007) 34. 
107Fentiman, Brussels I Regulation (supra n 52), 600-603; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (supra 
n 52), 448-449; D Joseph, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2010) 494; cf Briggs, supra n 54, 313 argues against the presumption that the primary duty of the 
court seised second is to stay its proceedings. He contends that the court should look at the litigation as a 
whole and take account of the likely consequences of the various forms of relief which might be ordered, and 
the effect which these would have on an orderly and coherent resolution of disputes before deciding whether 
to make an order. 
108Jenard Report on the Brussels Convention [1979] OJ C59/1, 41. 
109Case C-129/92 Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco EU:C:1994:400, [1994] QB 509, [74]-[79]. 
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proceedings under Article 28 should undoubtedly be influenced by the presence of exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses in favour of the English courts.  
 A question arises whether considerations of this nature are impermissible in the light of the 
decision in Gasser.110F110 It was there held that, if the criteria for ordering a mandatory stay under 
Article 27 are satisfied, then the court second seised must stay its proceedings even if the court 
second seised has jurisdiction under an exclusive choice of court agreement falling within Article 23. 
That conclusion was reached on the basis that, under Article 27, where there are two sets of 
proceedings which involve the same cause of action and the same parties, the court second seised is 
obliged to order a stay. The Brussels I Regulation only permits one set of proceedings to continue. 
The position is quite different under Article 28, which clearly contemplates that where there are two 
related sets of proceedings they may continue in parallel. That conclusion follows from the 
proposition that the grant of a stay is discretionary and not mandatory. Where Article 28 is engaged 
and there is an exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of the second seised court, it has been 
held by the English courts that the court second seised should exercise its discretion in favour of 
refusing a stay.111F111 This interpretation of the exercise of discretion under Article 28 received the seal 
of approval from the UK Supreme Court in the Alexandros T decision. It is quite obvious that a 
pragmatic approach to complex conflicts of jurisdiction in the EU demands that the claimant in the 
foreign proceedings is not condoned for breaching the exclusive choice of court agreement by suing 
in another court.   
 By refusing to stay proceedings under Article 28, the decision in the Alexandros T anticipates 
and is in line with the amendments to the lis pendens rules affected by the Brussels I Regulation 
Recast. Under the Brussels I Regulation Recast, deference to the principle of party autonomy in 
parallel proceedings will be augmented in an effort to resolve complex conflicts of jurisdiction in the 
EU. The prioritization of party autonomy reflects the ground realities of cross border commercial 
litigation, where the emphasis is on minimizing ‘litigation’112F112 and ‘transaction’113F113 risk and on the 
provision of remedies tailored to the needs of the litigants.114F114  
 
110Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl. [2003] ECR I-14693. 
111Nomura International Plc v Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena SpA [2013] EWHC 3187 (Comm) (Eder J); JP 
Morgan Europe Ltd v Primacom AG [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep 665 (Cooke J); Nordea Bank Norge ASA, Vasonia 
Shipping Company Limited v Unicredit Corporate Banking SpA, Banca di Roma SpA [2011] EWHC 30 (Comm) 
(Gloster J); Fawcett and Carruthers, supra n 52, 315; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (supra n 
52), 449; Fentiman, Brussels I Regulation (supra n 52) 602-603; T Kruger, Civil Jurisdiction Rules of the EU and 
their Impact on Third States (Oxford University Press, 2008) 309-311; cf Hill and Chong (supra n 52) 291.  
112Litigation risk is the risk to each party that any dispute will not be resolved in their preferred forum. 
Litigation risk which includes venue risk can be managed by the provision of jurisdiction agreements in 
international commercial contracts. See Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (supra n 52) Chapter 2.   
113Transaction risk is the risk that the parties’ expectations will be defeated by the application of a law which 
does not give effect to the object of the transaction. Transaction risk can be managed by the provision of 
choice of law agreements in international commercial contracts. See Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (supra n 52) Chapter 3. 
114Lord Mance’s apt statement in the foreword to R Fentiman’s International Commercial Litigation succinctly 
describes the significance of remedies in cross border commercial litigation before the English courts: ‘Ubi jus, 
ibi remedium might, for a practitioner, read ubi remedium, ibi jus.’ See Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation (supra n 52) Foreword vii. 
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M. Parallel proceedings and jurisdiction agreements under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) 
The Brussels I Regulation Recast which applies to legal proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 
2015 will reverse the effects of the CJEU’s decision in Gasser.115F115 The provisions of the Recast 
Regulation on parallel proceedings with the court second seised being nominated by a choice of 
court agreement differ from the position under the unreformed Brussels I Regulation and are closely 
aligned to the priority accorded to exclusive jurisdiction agreements by the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements.116F116 Article 29(1) of the Recast Regulation is subject to Article 31(2), 
which provides that, where a court has been chosen in accordance with Article 25 (the successor 
provision to Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation) any court of another Member State shall stay its 
proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no 
jurisdiction under the agreement.117F117 Where the court chosen has established that it has jurisdiction, 
any court of another Member State shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court118F118 and will be 
bound by its duty to recognize as conclusive the ruling of that court on the scope of the clause.119F119  
Recital 22 clarifies that the designated court “has priority to decide on the validity of the agreement 
and on the extent to which the agreement applies to the dispute pending before it”, even if it is 
second seised and even if the other court has not already decided on the stay of proceedings. 
Where, however, there is a conflict as to whether both courts have been chosen, the court first 
seised will determine the validity of the jurisdiction clause.120F120   
 The risk of the solution adopted by the Recast Regulation was outlined by Advocate General 
Léger in his Opinion in Gasser.121F121 He thought that such a solution might encourage delaying tactics 
by an unscrupulous party by alleging the existence of an agreement and bringing an action before 
the court allegedly chosen in order deliberately to delay judgment until that court had declared that 
115Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments (supra n 34) Chapter 
11; T C Hartley, “Choice-of-Court Agreements and the New Brussels I Regulation” (2013) Law Quarterly Review 
309; Tang (supra n 48) 215-219; T Ratkovic´ and D Zgrabljic´ Rotar, “Choice-of-Court Agreements under the 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast)” (2013) Journal of Private International Law 245. 
116Adopted at the 20th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Hague, 30th June 
2005. See Art 5 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. 
117See Recital 22 and Arts 29(1) and 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast. 
118Art 31(3) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast. 
119Case C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v Samskip GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548. 
120Art 31(1) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast. 
121Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693, Opinion of AG Léger, para 74; A Briggs, 
“What should be done about Jurisdiction Agreements” (2010) Yearbook of Private International Law 311, 319-
322; D Sancho Villa, “Jurisdiction over Jurisdiction and Choice of Court Agreements: Views on the Hague 
Convention of 2005 and Implications for the European Regime” (2010) Yearbook of Private International Law 
399, 404; Ratkovic´ and Zgrabljic´ Rotar (supra n 115) 263-265; I Queirolo, “Prorogation of Jurisdiction in the 
Proposal for a Recast of the Brussels I Regulation” in F Pocar, I Viarengo and F C Villata (eds), Recasting 
Brussels I (CEDAM, 2012) 183, 195; J P Cook, ‘Pragmatism in the European Union: Recasting the Brussels I 
Regulation to Ensure the Effectiveness of Exclusive Choice-of-Court Agreements’ (2013)  Aberdeen Student Law 
Review 76, 85; Petr Briza, “Choice-of-court Agreements: Could the Hague Choice of Court Agreements 
Convention and the Reform of the Brussels I Regulation be the way out of the Gasser–Owusu Disillusion?” 
(2009) Journal of Private International Law 537, 556-559; cf It is uncertain, however, how real a risk this new 
generation of torpedoes present: Hartley, Choice-of-Court Agreements and the New Brussels I Regulation 
(supra n 115), 312-313; Richard Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Oxford University Press, 2015) 
100; P Beaumont & B Yüksel, 'The Reform of the Brussels I Regulation on Choice of Court Agreements and the 
Preparation for the European Union’s Ratification of the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention' 
(2009) Spanish Yearbook of Private International Law 129-159. 
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it had no jurisdiction. This was a risk but presumably a lesser one than that to which Gasser gave 
rise, as the party would need to point to a jurisdiction agreement.  
 
N. The Court of Appeal validates declarations and damages award for breach of English exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement 
The case was remitted back to the Court of Appeal for adjudication on the substantive issues and the 
court has given its judgment.122F122 Although, the Court of Appeal’s judgment builds upon the prior 
decision of the UK Supreme Court on the issue of Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation – in 
particular, the finding of the Supreme Court that the claims in the two proceedings did not concern 
the same cause of action – it is likely that the Court of Appeal would have reached the same decision 
even if the Article 27 issue was not raised and adjudicated upon in the first place. The court decided 
that the Greek proceedings fell within the scope of the jurisdiction provisions of the underlying 
insurance contract and the settlement agreement. The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling of Burton J 
by granting declarations and damages for breach of English exclusive jurisdiction agreements. 
However, the full repercussions of the English judgment granting damages for breach of an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement for the jurisdiction of the Greek court were not examined by Longmore LJ.  
 In the UK Supreme Court judgment, Lord Clarke had expressed the opinion that a final 
judgment of the English courts would be recognisable in Greece and would assist the Greek court.123F123 
Therefore, he opined that the principles of mutual trust upon which the Brussels I Regulation is 
founded would be respected and the risk of irreconcilable judgments would be eliminated. However, 
in practical terms the Court of Appeal’s judgment awarding damages reassesses and nullifies or 
reverses the effect of the foreign proceedings. Where a choice of court agreement is breached, the 
appropriate measure of damages—to put the party in a position he would be in had the contract 
been performed and not been breached124F124—would be the difference between the hypothetical 
judgment that would have been obtained in the nominated forum and the actual judgment obtained 
in the non-contractual forum.125F125 Nullifying or reversing the effect of the foreign judgment is 
undoubtedly contrary to the principle of mutual trust and the obligation not to question the 
jurisdiction of another Member State court126F126 (which emanates from the principle of mutual trust). 
The multilateral double convention framework of common rules of direct jurisdiction and the 
122[2014] EWCA Civ 1010 (Longmore LJ with whom Rimer LJ and Lord Toulson agreed); See A Dickinson, “Once 
Bitten – Mutual Distrust in European Private International Law” (2015) Law Quarterly Review 186; J Ruddell, 
“Monetary Remedies for Wrongful Foreign Proceedings: The Alexandros T (No 2)” [2015] Lloyds Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 9. 
123The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70; [2014] 1 All ER 590; [2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 223, [96] (Lord Clarke). 
124Contractual damages are compensatory in nature as they aim to protect the ‘expectation interest’ of the 
claimant by placing him in the position that he would have been in had the contract been performed. See E 
McKendrick, Contract Law (9th edn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 339-343. 
125 It is submitted that difficulties in quantification pose a significant practical problem to an award of damages 
for breach of a choice of court agreement and present a formidable obstacle to rationally developing the 
damages remedy into a predictable response to breaches of jurisdiction agreements. See OT Africa Line Ltd v 
Magic Sportswear Corp [2005] EWCA Civ 710, [2005] 1 CLC 923, [33] (Longmore LJ); Briggs, Private 
International Law in English Courts (supra n 54) 399; F Garcimartin, ‘Chapter 11 – Article 31(2)-(4)’ in A 
Dickinson and E Lein (eds), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (Oxford University Press, 2015) 338.  
126Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Company [1991] ECR I-3317, [23]-
[25]; Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693, [48]. 
24 
 
                                                          
resulting simplified regime for the recognition and enforcement of Member State judgments is 
firmly anchored to the principle of mutual trust. An award of damages would reverse the effects of a 
Member State judgment and indirectly subvert Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation by questioning 
the assumption of jurisdiction by the court first seised.127F127 Given the effect of Article 27, a party is 
entitled to test the validity and effect of the jurisdiction agreement in any Member State court.128F128 
Arguably, to penalize such conduct would undermine that party’s right to seise its preferred court, 
embodied in Article 27. It might also be characterized as an assault on the entitlement of that court 
to determine whether it has jurisdiction.129F129 In similar vein, declarations for breach of English 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements may also infringe the mutual trust principle. A declaratory order 
stating that English exclusive jurisdiction agreements have been breached implies that proceedings 
in other Member State courts within the scope of the jurisdiction provisions are wrongfully pursued. 
A declaratory order explicitly stating that proceedings in another Member State are in breach or 
blatantly in breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction agreement are even more confrontational and 
necessarily at odds with the mutual trust principle. As observed, Article 27 of the Brussels I 
Regulation allows a party to test the jurisdiction agreement in any Member State court. As such, the 
declaratory relief might also be characterized as an assault on the entitlement of a Member State 
court to determine whether it has jurisdiction. However, arguably, a declaration raises far fewer 
mutual trust concerns than an anti-suit injunction or the damages remedy in similar circumstances. 
A declaration that an exclusive choice of court agreement is binding will provide an effective 
anticipatory defence to recognition of a judgment obtained in breach of the clause.130F130 Declaratory 
relief has been employed as a shield to deny recognition to a judgment from another Member State 
court in breach of an English arbitration agreement.131F131 Declarations that a clause is contractually 
binding may also provide a springboard for claims for damages; and depending on the private 
international law rules of the foreign court, may be used to establish a res judicata abroad.132F132     
 Even though the UK Supreme Court has held that Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I 
Regulation are not applicable and that the English and Greek proceedings do not share the same 
cause of action, the judgment of the Court of Appeal may still interfere with the right of the Greek 
court to determine its jurisdiction and may render the continuance of the Greek proceedings or for 
that matter the institution of any other foreign proceedings futile as any potential sum recovered 
under a future Greek or other foreign judgment would have to be reversed, clawed back and used to 
indemnify the insurers as a breach of the English exclusive jurisdiction agreements. Thus, the 
damages award may have a restraining or preclusive effect on the foreign proceedings very similar 
to an anti-suit injunction. It may be argued that if the specific performance of a jurisdiction 
agreement can no longer be granted due to the constraints imposed by the European Union law of 
international civil procedure, the common law remedy of damages may equally not be awarded. 
After all both anti suit injunctions and the damages remedy for breach of choice of court agreements 
127Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (supra n 52), 88-90. 
128See Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl. [2003] ECR I-14693. 
129Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit EU:C:2004:228, [2005] 1 AC 101. 
130Under the English common law jurisdictional regime, the declaration will establish that s 32 of the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 applies, unless there was submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign 
court. 
131West Tankers v Allianz [2011] EWHC 829 (Comm); West Tankers v Allianz [2012] EWCA Civ 27. 
132T Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction (Oxford University Press, 2008) 344-345. 
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are grounded on the same contractual right not to be sued in a non-elected forum.133F133 Therefore, if 
the intrusive anti suit injunction enforcing the underlying contractual right not to be sued in a non-
elected forum falls foul of the European Union law of international civil procedure, the damages 
remedy may also succumb to a similar fate. Even if a procedural characterization of anti-suit 
injunctions is preferred, the availability of damages in lieu or in addition to specific performance also 
highlights the concomitant and coextensive nature of the remedies.134F134 The overarching principle of 
mutual trust and the principle of the effectiveness of EU law (effet utile)135F135 are undermined by the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment as the English court is seeking to force its own view on the validity and 
effectiveness of the settlement and jurisdiction agreements on the Greek court. As a result, the 
Greek court’s right to determine its own procedural jurisdiction (kompetenz-kompetenz) and to rule 
on the substance of the case may be overridden by the recognition of the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in the Greek courts under Chapter III of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 From the perspective of effective dispute resolution, it should be noted that dispute 
resolution is itself undermined if the English courts attempt to re-open or second guess a foreign 
court’s decision on the basis that the English court is the chosen venue. The dispute is effectively 
protracted136F136 and not resolved with the incidence of satellite or sub-litigation and the increased 
potential for conflicting Member State judgments.137F137 For the litigants, protracted litigation will result 
133Donohue v Armco Inc. [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749; The breach of an arbitration agreement, if it is 
governed by English law, also gives a right to damages: See Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-
Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35, [2013] 1 WLR 1889; In West Tankers Inc. v Alliance SpA 
[2012] EWHC 854 (Comm) [78], Flaux J determined that the arbitral tribunal “was not deprived, by reason of 
European law, of the jurisdiction to award equitable damages for breach of the obligation to arbitrate.”; cf 
Hartley casts doubt on Flaux J’s decision and argues that imposing damages for suing in the ‘wrong’ court 
would prevent the party concerned from even trying to sue in the other Member State: ‘Such a ruling would 
be an antisuit injunction in all but name.’ See T C Hartley, “The Brussels I Regulation and Arbitration” (2014) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 843, 862-864; On the contrary, in Case C-536/13 Gazprom OAO 
EU:C:2015:316, the CJEU purports to limit the prohibition on anti-suit injunctions in aid of arbitration 
agreements to court to court proceedings in the Member States, which would grant tribunals freedom to 
enforce arbitral autonomy unhindered by the EU rules on civil procedure, mutual trust and the principle of 
effectiveness (effet utile). 
134See s 50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (England & Wales) which restates the powers originally granted to 
the Court of Chancery by s 2 of the Chancery Amendment Act 1858, commonly known as the Lord Cairns’ Act. 
135In matters not expressly covered by the terms of an EU instrument such as the Brussels I Regulation, 
Member States may apply national substantive and procedural rules provided that they do not render the 
application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult: Case 288/82 Duijnstee v Goderbauer [1983] ECR 3663, 
[13]; Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565, [29].  
136A Nuyts, “The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements Further to Gasser and the Community Principle of 
Abuse of Right” in P de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Hart 
Publishing, 2007) 57. 
137A Dickinson, “Brussels I Review – Choice of Court Agreements” (Conflictoflaws.net, 11 June 2009) 
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/brussels-i-review-choice-of-court-agreements/> accessed 15 December 2014; 
A Dickinson, “Response to the Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters” (Europa.eu, 
30 June 2009). 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_others
/mr_andrew_dickinson_en.pdf> accessed 15 December 2014, para 24;  
Response of the Law Society of England and Wales,   
“Review of Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 




                                                          
in higher costs and expenses.138F138 To quote Briggs, ‘In other words, litigation about where to litigate 
will be replaced by litigation about where the litigation should have taken place.’139F139 However, there 
is a strong argument that litigation about where litigation should have taken place is neither an 
efficient nor effective method of dispute resolution in international commercial litigation.140F140 Above 
all, the damages remedy fails to deliver what many potential claimants desire most, particularly in an 
action in debt; it cannot deliver prompt, summary judgment on the merits in the agreed court.141F141 
Hence, damages for breach of a forum selection agreement and their deterrent value are a ‘second-
best solution’ to a uniform EU wide mechanism for the avoidance of parallel proceedings ab initio, as 
was suggested in the Commission proposal.142F142 Where available, an anti-suit injunction is likely to be 
a commercial litigant’s preferred option.143F143   
 Notwithstanding any arguments to the contrary, the Court of Appeal held that the claims for 
declarations and damages for breach of the exclusive jurisdiction agreements did not breach EU law 
even though the matter has not yet been decided by the CJEU nor resolved by EU legislation. 
Moreover, it considered it unnecessary to send a preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU to 
the CJEU on the legality and legitimacy of the declarations and damages remedy in the European 
Union Judicial Area despite repeated requests from Starlight.144F144 It may be argued that this issue did 
warrant a preliminary reference to the CJEU as it would have helped clarify whether the CJEU’s 
ruling in Turner v Grovit does preclude the recovery of damages for breach of an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement. Had a preliminary reference on the issue been sent to the CJEU, the answer 
received would have probably been very different from the one delivered by the Court of Appeal. It 
is highly unlikely that the CJEU would have favoured a contractual remedy for the European conflicts 
/law_society_england_wales_en.pdf > accessed 15 December 2014, para 12; cf Bar Council of England and 
Wales’ Response to the Brussels I Regulation Green Paper, para 3.9. 
138Dickinson, Brussels I Review – Choice of Court Agreements (supra n 137); Dickinson, Response to the Green 
Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (supra n 137) 
139A Briggs, “The Impact of Recent Judgments of the European Court on English Procedural Law and Practice” 
(2005) Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht 231-262; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11/2006 
<Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=899689> accessed 15 December 2014, 20. 
140See L Tichý, “Protection against Abuse of Process in the Brussels I Review Proposal?” in E Lein (ed), The 
Brussels I Review Proposal Uncovered (BIICL, 2012) 103, 189: Professor Tichý refers to the damages remedy as 
‘a weak consolation’ due to the need for separate enforcement proceedings. 
141Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (supra n 52), 90; Richard Fentiman, ‘Parallel Proceedings and 
Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe’ in P de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial 
Area (Hart Publishing, 2007) 45; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (supra n 121), 113. 
142M Illmer, “Chapter 2 – Article 1” in A Dickinson and E Lein (eds), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (Oxford 
University Press, 2015) 80 (discussing damages for breach of arbitration agreements but the same analysis 
applies to damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements by parity of reasoning). 
143Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2015) (supra n 121), 113; Briggs, supra n 54, 399; S Males, 
“Comity and Anti-Suit Injunctions” [1998] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 543, 550. 
144The English courts, in the litigation that followed the CJEU’s West Tankers ruling, appear to be very reluctant 
to refer matters to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. It seems that the negative perception of the CJEU’s 
decisions in West Tankers, Turner, and Gasser in the eyes of the English courts may have a part to play in this 
reluctance to refer matters for a preliminary ruling. Moreover, the English courts may wish to continue to rely 
on alternatives to anti suit injunctions regardless of their potential incompatibility with the Brussels I 
Regulation as interpreted by the CJEU. See M Illmer, “English Court of Appeal Confirms Damages Award for 
Breach of a Jurisdiction Agreement” (Conflictoflaws.net, 31 July 2014) < 
http://conflictoflaws.net/2014/english-court-of-appeal-confirms-damages-award-for-breach-of-a-jurisdiction-
agreement/> accessed 15 December 2014; Dickinson, Once Bitten – Mutual Distrust in European Private 
International Law (supra n 122), 190-191. 
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of jurisdiction which has made its way through the back door as an ingenious alternative to the 
defunct anti-suit injunction.145F145 The lack of a higher authority based on definitive EU law principles 
means that the pragmatic virtues of the decision in Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others 
(The Alexandros T) will prevail in the English courts for now.146F146 
 
O. The High Court rules on the Construction of the Settlement Agreements and the Specific 
Performance of the ‘LMI Settlement Agreement’147F147 
On 26 September 2014, Flaux J delivered judgment in the latest round of The Alexandros T 
litigation.148F148 Flaux J decided that as a matter of construction, the settlement agreements settled 
claims against the insurers and the servants or agents, and that claims within the scope of the 
settlement agreements included those now brought in Greece against the insurers and their 
servants or agents. In any event, as a matter of English law the settlement agreements released the 
servants or agents from liability insofar as the liability alleged was as joint tortfeasors. Under English 
145See Illmer (supra n 142) 79; G Cuniberti and M Requejo, ‘La sanction des clauses d'élection de for par l'octroi 
de dommages et intérêts’, ERA Forum 2010-1 (SSRN, February 18, 2010). <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689417> 
or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1689417> accessed 15 December 2014; Briggs, Agreements (supra n 50) 
Chapter 8, 330-338; Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments 
(supra n 34) Chapter 10, 220; Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (supra n 52) 90; J Harris, 
“Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Where Next?” [2009] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 537, 547; C J S Knight, “The Damage of Damages: Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law” 
(2008) Journal of Private International Law 501, 509; E Peel, “Introduction” in P de Vareilles-Sommieres (ed), 
Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Hart Publishing, 2007) 1, 15-17; Fentiman, Parallel Proceedings 
and Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe (supra n 141), 43-45; Nuyts (supra n 136) 57; Briza (supra n 121) 548-
554; cf Raphael (supra n 132) 294; Blobel and Späth (supra n 36) 545-546, highlight the counterproductive 
effects of secondary remedies on the principle of mutual trust in the European Union; A Dutta and C Heinze, 
“Prozessführungsverbote im englischen und europäischen Zivilverfahrensrecht” (2005)  Zeitschrift für 
Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP) 428, 458-461, suggest that damages in relation of the foreign court’s 
substantive liability award are impermissible, but that damages in respect of litigation costs are more 
defensible, although still doubtful; G Carducci, “The New EU Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on 
Jurisdiction and International Arbitration” (2013) Arbitration International 467, 489, is more optimistic 
regarding the compatibility of damages for breach of an arbitration agreement with the Brussels I Regulation; 
see also the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-536/13 Gazprom OAO EU:C:2014:2414, n 87, 
who regarded an award of damages as compatible with the Brussels I Regulation, although it was not in issue 
in that case. AG Wathelet refers to the European Parliament resolution of 7 September 2010 on the 
implementation and review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in support of his opinion. 
(P7_TA(2010)0304, recital M). 
146Christopher Clarke LJ has recently cited with approval and reiterated the landmark ruling of Longmore LJ in 
Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Others (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 1010, that EU law presents 
no obstacle to enforcing a cause of action of damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. In 
doing so he emphasised the divide between issues of jurisdiction which were a matter for the German courts 
and the private law rights and obligations of the parties in relation to the contractual choice of court 
agreement and ancillary claims in tort for inducing breach of the choice of court agreement: Marzillier, Dr 
Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH v AMT Futures Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 143, [61]-[62] 
(Christopher Clarke LJ with whom Tomlinson LJ and Laws LJ agreed). 
147The abbreviation ‘LMI’ refers to the ‘Lloyd’s Market Insurers’ and the relevant terms of the settlement 
agreement between Starlight and LMI are reproduced in [2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm), [7] (Flaux J) and [2013] 
UKSC 70, [9] (Lord Clarke).  
148[2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm) (Flaux J). 
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law, settlement with one alleged joint tortfeasor releases all other alleged joint tortfeasors.149F149 The 
upshot of the findings on construction was that the proceedings in Greece against the servants or 
agents were in breach of the settlement agreements. The servants or agents were thereby entitled 
to the substantive relief granted by Burton J to the insurers.  
 Flaux J also decided that it was appropriate to decree specific performance of the LMI 
settlement agreement and to grant mandatory injunctions to execute a "Receipt and Recognition of 
Release Agreement".150F150 The “specific performance of the promise not to sue”151F151 in a settlement 
agreement is comparable to an anti-suit injunction enforcing the more specific and separate 
contract not to sue in a court other than the contractual forum in an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement.152F152 From one perspective the English court has equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions 
which may assist in the recognition of English judgments before the courts of another EU Member 
State. However, it is submitted that the decree of specific performance of the LMI settlement 
agreement may be a greater infringement of mutual trust and the principle of the effectiveness of 
EU law (effet utile) than declarations and damages for breach of English exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements as injunctive relief is inherently more intrusive, directly interferes with the right of the 
Greek court to determine its own jurisdiction and imposes on it the English court’s understanding of 
the settlement agreement and its enforcement.153F153 Therefore, the specific performance of the LMI 
settlement agreement may pre-empt the Greek court’s own independent assessment of the 
settlement agreements’ scope, validity, effectiveness and enforcement. As such the interference 
with the Greek court’s right to determine its own jurisdiction and the resulting futility of the Greek 
proceedings is directly comparable to the effect of an anti-suit injunction. It is relatively easy to 
assess that the English court did not repose trust in its Greek counterpart to faithfully apply the 
Brussels I Regulation.  
 The HD parties (Hill Dickinson and individual lawyers) and the CTa parties (Charles Taylor 
Adjusting Ltd and an individual adjustor) sought to enforce the promise made by Starlight not to sue 
them by the terms of the settlement agreements through a damages award pursuant to the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. In light of Flaux J’s findings on the construction issue 
that the settlement agreements encompassed the servants or agents of the insurers, he held that 
the agreements purported to confer a benefit on the third parties and there was nothing in the 
agreements to suggest that this was not the parties’ intention for the purposes of Section 1(2) of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Furthermore, this finding meant that the third parties 
were “expressly identified in the contract by name [or] as a class” by the term “underwriters” in the 
settlement agreements. Accordingly, Flaux J considered that the third parties did have a claim for 
damages for breach of the settlement agreements pursuant to the 1999 Act.  
 It will, of course, be a matter for the Greek court to decide whether to recognise the English 
judgments of the Court of Appeal, Burton and Flaux JJ. In Gothaer v Samskip the CJEU decided that a 
149See Gladman Commercial Properties v Fisher Hargreaves Proctor [2013] EWCA Civ 1466 (Briggs LJ). 
150[2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm), [73]-[79] (Flaux J). 
151Ibid, [75] (Flaux J). 
152Briggs equates an exclusive jurisdiction agreement with a settlement agreement in relation to a cause of 
action of damages for breach of the promise not to sue contrary to the agreement: Briggs, supra n 121, 323.  
153Flaux J observes that damages would clearly be an inadequate remedy for the breaches of the LMI 
settlement agreement or the other settlement agreements: [2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm), [80] (Flaux J).  
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decision of a Member State to decline jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdiction agreement in favour 
of another Member State is a judgment which qualifies for recognition under Chapter III of the 
Brussels I Regulation.154F154 Moreover, the necessary underpinning for the operative part of the 
judgment must also be recognized.155F155 However, recognition is subject to the limited defences to 
recognition in Articles 34 and 35 of the Brussels I Regulation, including if the recognition of the 
judgment is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is 
sought.156F156 In this case, the decision on the scope of the jurisdiction agreements is intertwined with 
the decision to award damages and declaratory relief for the breach of the jurisdiction agreements 
and the specific enforcement of the LMI settlement agreement. Since the latter rulings are 
potentially prohibited by the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the Greek court may choose to refer the 
matter for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. The question referred would seek a clarification on 
the grounds for refusing recognition to a Member State judgment and in particular whether a 
judgment awarding damages and declaratory relief for breach of a jurisdiction agreement and 
specific performance of the LMI settlement agreement falls foul of the public policy defence. It is 
submitted that the principle of mutual trust is the ‘bedrock upon which EU justice policy should be 
built’157F157 and may be considered to be a component of European Union public policy.158F158 Hence, a 
judgment which undermines the principles of mutual trust and the effectiveness of the Regulation 





154 Case C-456/11 Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG v Samskip GmbH EU:C:2012:719, [2013] QB 548. 
155 Ibid paras 40-41; the recognition of both the result and the reasons underpinning the decision was referred 
to by the counsel for the defendants in argument before Flaux J as a ‘Euro-estoppel’. Mutual trust between the 
courts of the Member States necessitates the recognition of the equivalence of judicial decisions from all 
Member States; For a critical analysis of the CJEU’s ruling in Gothaer v Samskip and the development of the 
concept of European Res Judicata, see E Torralba-Mendiola and E Rodriguez-Pineau, “Two’s Company, Three’s 
a Crowd: Jurisdiction, Recognition and Res Judicata in the European Union” (2014) Journal of Private 
International Law 403. 
156 Art 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation; Art 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast.  
157 The EU Justice Agenda for 2020 - Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the Union COM(2014) 
144 final. 
158 For a discussion of a European Union public policy exception to the rules regarding the enforcement of 
judgments: See, A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and 
Subsidiarity in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 194-
198; J Kramberger Škerl, “European Public Policy (With an Emphasis on Exequatur Proceedings)” (2011) Journal 
of Private International Law 461, 468-474; A Mills, “The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International 
Law” (2008) Journal of Private International Law 201, 214; It is not for the CJEU to define the content of the 
public policy of the Contracting State but the Court of Justice has adopted the view that the limits of public 
policy are a question of interpretation of the Brussels Convention and are therefore a matter which must be 
determined by it: Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935 [22]-[23]; Case C-38/98 Renault v 
Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973 [27]-[28]; Case C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc [2009] ECR 
I-2563 [26]-[28]. 
159 European Union public policy operates as a form of flexibility in the application of uniform rules throughout 
Europe and unlike national public policy it does not need to be attenuated. See Mills, The Confluence of Public 
and Private International Law (supra n 158), 197. 
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P. Conclusions 
Notwithstanding the fact that The Alexandros T litigation is governed by the European Union private 
international law regime’s Brussels I Regulation, it is reminiscent of a conception of international 
commercial litigation which borrows from the pragmatic spirit of the English common law of conflict 
of laws. The UK Supreme Court’s decision confirms a narrow approach to the ‘same cause of action’ 
issue in Article 27 and ensures that the provision bites in relatively straightforward situations where 
the causes of action are ‘mirror images’ of one another. However, it may be observed that the UK 
Supreme Court majority’s overly narrow and instrumental conception of the ‘same cause of action’ 
may have served the cause of substantive justice in the individual case, but from a European Union 
systemic perspective it may give rise to inconsistent judgments, which the lis pendens provision in 
the Brussels I Regulation is designed to eliminate from the very outset. Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Mance differed from the majority’s very narrow view and Lord Mance reasoned that the English 
claims for a declaration that the Greek claims had been settled or were compromised within the 
terms of the release were mirror images of the Greek tort claims as one asserted and the other 
denied the existence of liability. As a consequence, the future recognition and enforcement of the 
English judgments in the Greek courts might impact on the right of the Greek court to determine its 
procedural jurisdiction or kompetenz-kompetenz. Moreover, the overly narrow interpretation of the 
‘same cause of action’ might give rise to the dilemma that would be encountered if both the English 
and Greek courts reached a mutually inconsistent decision, which then had to be recognised and 
enforced in a third state.  
 The UK Supreme Court’s narrow conception of the ‘same cause of action’ ensures that the 
tripartite requirements of same cause, same object and same parties are necessary for the operation 
of Article 27. Alternative approaches to Article 27, which adopt a broad brush interpretation of 
‘same cause of action’ and focus on the overall result in each jurisdiction rather than individual 
claims within each set of proceedings, were rejected by the UK Supreme Court. Other approaches to 
the issue which focus on the spectre of irreconcilable judgments rather than a comparison of the 
individual claims in each set of proceedings are also inconsistent with the UK Supreme Court’s 
understanding of Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation. The irrelevance of the defences raised in 
each set of proceedings supports the argument for a narrow construction of Article 27. 
 A narrow construction of Article 27 has obvious implications for the scope of operation of 
Article 28. Article 28 is broader, taking into account entire actions, rather than specific claims and 
defences can be taken into account as well. In cases where the strict tripartite test of Article 27 is 
not met, Article 28 with its discretionary power to stay in case of related actions is available as a 
more flexible alternative. It is submitted that, the exercise of the discretion to stay proceedings 
under Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation was legitimately denied effect in order to accord 
deference to jurisdictional party autonomy. The UK Supreme Court’s instrumental interpretation of 
Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation will go a long way in enabling English courts to deal 
effectively with the abusive litigation tactics that the unreformed lis pendens provision encourages in 
cases involving jurisdiction agreements for Member State courts. From January 10, 2015, Article 31 
read in conjunction with Recital 22 of the Brussels I Regulation Recast augments jurisdictional party 
autonomy in the EU by reversing the effects of the notorious decision in Gasser and obliging any 
courts other than the chosen court to stay and ultimately decline their proceedings.  
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 The Court of Appeal’s decision clarifying that the claims for declarations and damages for 
breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements are not in breach of EU law will not be the final word on 
this contentious and as yet unresolved issue. The compatibility of an English decree of specific 
performance of the settlement agreement with the mutual trust principle and the right of the Greek 
court to determine its own jurisdiction is even more questionable. A future preliminary reference to 
the CJEU on these issues may result in an answer reaffirming the mutual trust principle as an 
essential pre-requisite or condition for the multilateral jurisdiction and judgments order created by 
the Brussels I Regulation. Therefore, any argument supporting the enforcement of the private law 
rights and obligations of the parties to the jurisdiction agreement or settlement agreement may be 
perceived as necessarily distorting the systemic and distributive function of private international law 
as a structural coordinating framework for the allocation of regulatory authority.           
 Two tactical issues of potential value to cross border commercial litigators arise from this 
decision. On settlement, where there is any risk of follow-on foreign proceedings which are in 
breach of the settlement, it is worth not discontinuing or seeking a dismissal of the English 
proceedings. A stay (such as under a Tomlin Order) allows the original proceedings to be resurrected 
to enforce the settlement, and will help with any argument on the question of which court was first 
seised. A second tactical issue is that, if stayed proceedings do have to be resurrected in order to 
enforce a settlement in the face of competing foreign proceedings, careful thought must be given as 
to how any additional claims should be framed. This is because claims in complex transnational 
commercial litigation may crystallize over time and entirely new claims which are not based on the 
original proceedings or are based on facts which were not known at the time of the institution of the 
original proceedings may affect the issue of when the court is seised.  The UK Supreme Court 
managed to reach a conclusion in this case without having to make a reference to the CJEU, but it 
did make clear that this is an uncertain point of law. 
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